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Comment on Fikentscher's Paper
Modes of Thought in Law and Justice
- A Preliminary Report on a Study in
Legal Anthropology*
Jerome Hall**
Communication between a German legal philosopher and an Ameri-
can one should not be difficult. Both cultures are "western," and the
immigration of many German legal scholars has made German legal
thought well known in the United States.' American jurisprudence is
equally well known in Germany. However, in Professor Wolfgang
Fikentscher's preliminary report on his forthcoming book, Modes of
Thought on Law and Justice, references to Austin, Pound, Hart, and
Fuller are conspicuously absent.2 This is due to his concentration on
legal anthropology. It may be that this writer's disagreement with cer-
tain parts of Professor Fikentscher's theory of law will diminish once
the entire book becomes available.
In order to understand my reaction to Professor Fikentscher's theory
of law, it is necessary to describe my background in jurisprudence and
my own theory of law. Although Bentham's writings in analytical juris-
* This paper was presented at a meeting of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies,
Berkeley, April 1987. Many stylistic changes have been made in this publication. The
original paper will be published in the Center's Protocol of the 56th Colloquy. The
Center has granted permission to publish this paper in the U.C. Davis Law Review.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. J.D.,
1923, Univ. of Chicago; S.J.D., 1935, Harvard; J.S.D., 1935, Columbia; LL.D., 1958,
North Dakota; LL.D, 1978, Tilbingen.
I Roscoe Pound wrote extensively about German legal philosophy, the Modern and
the 20th Century Legal Philosophy translations and the publications of Hans Kelsen's
books into English have made German legal philosophies well known in the United
States.
2 He does refer to Holmes' non-normative definition of "law" which he apparently
accepts as valid, and he translates Llewellyn's "law-way" as "mode of thought." W.
Fikentscher, Modes of Thought in Law and Justice - A Preliminary Report on a
Study in Anthropology 16 (1987) (available at University of California, Davis, Law
Review).
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prudence preceded Austin's, in English-speaking countries Austin is re-
garded as the primary figure in that type of analysis. Austin's defini-
tion of positive law originated in a sovereign's commands to his
subjects, commands enforced by a sanction - a negative privation. Al-
ternatively, the sovereign was not subject to anyone.' Kelsen stated his
concept of law in terms of a hypothetical judgment in which a set of
circumstances culminating in a delict was joined to a physical sanction.
"Validity" meant conformity to the procedure prescribed in a basic hy-
pothetical norm. Later, H.L.A. Hart and others criticized both Austin's
and Kelsen's concepts of law because these concepts focused on "com-
mand." Hart distinguished primary rules, such as criminal laws that
are sanctioned commands, from secondary rules, which confer powers
to make contracts, to marry, to make a will, and so on. He believed that
law was a "union" of primary and secondary rules.
The distinction between powers and duties led to Hohfeld's scheme
of four legal relations stated in terms of correlatives: right-duty, privi-
lege-no right, power-liability, and disability-immunity. Later writers
substituted "susceptibility" for "liability" and pointed out that two of
these legal relations, privilege-no right and immunity-disability, were
merely negatives of the other two. They concluded that from an analyt-
ical perspective only two jural relations exist, namely, right-duty and
power-susceptibility.
My contribution to the debate is that law is a categorical judgment
(the primary rules) to which a hypothetical judgment (secondary rules)
is instrumental. In sum, the legal relation, right-duty, is essential.
Power-susceptibility is also essential because it is the use of power that
creates the right-duty relation. The use of power precedes the origin of
the right-duty relation. Accordingly, in a dynamic theory of law, law
can be both hypothetical and categorical.
In western jurisprudence, a perennial battle has raged between natu-
ral law advocates and legal positivists. The battle centers on the ques-
tion of whether "law" should be applied only to morally valid statutes
and decisions, or whether any command of a sovereign or any hypothet-
ical judgment based on an assumed Grundnorm is "law." '4
Both Plato and Aquinas wrote that statutes which oppose reason are
not laws. They also wrote that there are good laws and bad laws. Su-
3 Sir Henry Maine criticized the generalized inclusion of the sovereign, stating that
in his many years in India, no maharajah promulgated a command; Indian law was
customary.
4 Professor Fikentscher ignores this issue in his definition of law, perhaps because
most anthropologists ignore it.
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perficially, this appears to be a contradiction. However, there is an ex-
planation to support consistency: society and even practicing attorneys
speak of some laws as good and other laws as bad. From this societal
perspective, it is absurd to say that "law" is restricted to good laws.
However, from a scientific or philosophical perspective it is necessary to
proceed along lines that are significant in a science of law: "law" must
be restricted to uniform data, for example, to good statutes and
decisions.
Proceeding in this direction, and supplementing my earlier definition
of the structure of law, I selected the following seven categories or crite-
ria: (1) law is morally valid; (2) it serves sound goals; (3) it is sup-
ported by public attitudes; (4) regularity rather than "system;" (5) it
protects public interests; (6) it is supreme - when challenged by other
norms; and (7) it is inexorable since, unlike membership in a voluntary
association, one cannot resign from the state when summoned to court
- the law is inexorably imposed on everyone's will. Finally, my phi-
losophy of law has been correctly described as sociological, nonscholas-
tic natural law.
Professor Fikentscher's thesis is that "the anthropological concept of
'modes of thought' properly redefined is able to explain cross-cultural
differences in legal thinking."' "Modes of thought" include "animism,
Hinduism, Islam, Greek Tragic, Calvinist belief in predestination,
[and] Marxism." '6 He states that such ideas can be used in a "synepei-
cal" way, which means "consequential reasoning."'7 He also defines
synepeics as a "thought-modal comparison" which may be analyzed in
four stages or levels.'
He begins with examples of cultural misunderstandings, based pre-
sumably on different "modes of thought." It is noteworthy that none of
these examples deals with basic values, such as those implied in com-
mon-law felonies. It is also significant that Professor Fikentscher's pa-
per and lengthy bibliography omit any reference to Redfield, Kluck-
hohn, or even Boas, who wrote about common values shared by
advanced and primitive peoples regarding indiscriminate homicide,
theft, incest, and other major crimes. Instead, Professor Fikentscher fol-
lows the path of anthropologists who, in an attempt to avoid bias and
ethnocentric intolerance, rely on "relativism" which espouses the
W. Fikentscher, supra note 2, at i.
6 Id.
7Id.
I Id. at 13.
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unique values of each tribe or society, denying validity to any possible
universal valuation.
Professor Fikentscher seems to be ambivalent on the issue of basic
values. He concludes that " 'right' and 'wrong' are . . . no[t] absolute
criteria, but propositions related to, and receiving their meaning from, a
specific mode of thought."9 For example, he states that a Muslim
should not criticize the principle of separation of church and state from
a Muslim point of view, but rather that a Muslim's criticism should be
based on "a method which surpasses specific modes of thought." 10 This
raises interesting questions regarding the criticism of Nazi and Com-
munist ideologies from a western democratic perspective. He concludes
that "an existing mode of thought, as part of an existing culture, should
be respected by the participants of other cultures."" Would this "re-
spect" by other cultures include the English termination of the forced
suicide of Indian widows, and the retention of other colonial laws after
the independence of the colonies? Alternatively, he uses the nuclear
Chernobyl disaster which led to changes in Soviet information policy as
an example of the changes that are possible when a mode of thought is
"confronted 
. . . by mere fact."' 2
It is obvious that different cultures think in different ways.' 3 In some
respects, Professor Fikentscher's thesis resembles Savigny's historical
jurisprudence in positing a unique Volksgeist which implies that criti-
cism and comparison are not relevant. However, German laws and the-
ories have been adopted in many other countries.
Professor Fikentscher's approach utilizes four types or stages of
synepeics. The first stage seems to be simply recognition of specific
modes of thought. The second, which discusses aspects of comparison
thinking, is limited to the rejection of criticism of one mode of thought
by reliance on another mode of thought.i4 The third concerns common
denominators of comparison,' 5 and the fourth is "applied anthropology"
- policy questions based on the third stage.' 6
The common denominators "consist of rather formal ideas."' 7 Con-
cepts like causality, time, and risk "vary from one mode of thought to
9 Id. at 17.
10 Id. at 19.
11 Id. at 27.
12 Id. at 23-24.
13 Cultural differences are the subject of many books; among the best is Ruth
Benedict's, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, about Japanese culture.
14 W. Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 19-28.
15 Id. at 29-39.
16 Id. at 39-44.
17 Id. at 33.
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another."'" In order to "link" the various modes of thought to historic
events, a "meta-concept" is required.19 Meta-concepts include "meta-
causality, meta-time, meta-risk," and so on.20 Professor Fikentscher's
logic may be excellent but in the absence of specific examples it is not
persuasive. It is not merely that as every generalization rises in abstrac-
tion it loses the distinctive meanings of what it subsumes, but also that
in some situations no meaningful meta-concept is conceivable. For ex-
ample, if dissidents are considered psychotic in a Communist mode of
thought but are regarded as quite normal in the American mode of
thought, what meta-concept other than a vacuous generalization is con-
ceivable? What meta-concept would adequately include both an ulti-
mate impersonal god and the very personal one of the Abrahamic
religions?
Professor Fikentscher concedes that "[a]s to values, the meta-level is
even harder to . . . define[]. 21 He says that "[e]very mode of thought
[is] [en]title[d] to be respected as long as it respects . . . others. 22
This hypothetical condition ignores serious differences in valuation.
Apparently he believes that "[t]he right to ask for and to discuss val-
ues" 23 adequately subsumes obvious differences in valuation. Synepeics
stage four includes an appeal for "cross-cultural tolerance. 2 4
My analysis may be the result of Professor Fikentscher's concentra-
tion on cultural differences. Professor Fikentscher neglects the sharing
of major values, that is, those values necessary for survival, values
raised by common problems and a common human nature. The empha-
sis on differences and the appeal for toleration represent a questionable
relativism. In addition, Professor Fikentscher uses conflicting and
amorphous terms. For example, although "consequential thinking"
suggests utilitarianism or pragmatism to an American, Professor
Fikentscher has another meaning in mind. Other unexplained terms,
for example, "authorization," take us to the second half of his paper
which is intended to demonstrate the value of synepeics for the defini-
tion of law.
In reading this section one must remember Professor Fikentscher's




21 Id. at 34.
22 Id. at 35.
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id. at 40(a).
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are decisive in defining "law." What is striking is the failure to distin-
guish between a scholar's concept of law and tribal or public opinion
about law, and thus to ignore the basic issues that divide legal posi-
tivists' definitions of law from those of natural law advocates.
Finally, there is the striking absence of any reference to Hans Kel-
sen. Instead, Professor Fikentscher concentrates on the work of Leopold
Pospisil, an anthropologist at Yale who studied law in Czechoslovakia.
Had he chosen Hoebel, an anthropologist who is not a legal scholar,
but who adopted Hohfeld's legal analysis, the outcome might have been
very different.
I can understand and agree with Professor Fikentscher's rejection of
Pospisil's "authority" as leadership. This is consistent with the criti-
cism of "sovereign" by Anglo-American scholars. However, although I
find authority in the acceptance of the categorical moral principles em-
bodied in my concept of law, I am at a loss to understand Professor
Fikentscher's position. He rejects leadership and states that authority
"consists . . . in the acknowledgement of the necessity of reality-chang-
ing values. '25 However, in my view law is usually a conservative
agency intended to preserve the status quo. He also states that "the
crucial element is that law by virtue of its validity is authorizing some-
one" 26 but he does not define "validity," either as a logical or an ethical
concept. It is, therefore, impossible to know what this statement asserts.
Professor Fikentscher also rejects Pospisil's second element, "obliga-
tio," which means "a legal relation between certain persons, '"27 because
it is of doubtful existence in fragmented societies and was non-existent
in classical China and Japan. He concludes that "obligatio" is not a
necessary element for the definition of law.28 From the western juris-
prudence perspective, this contention is invalid and hardly conceivable.
There is disagreement regarding whether every duty has a correlative
right, some holding that this is not true of criminal law. However,
apart from that questionable exception, western jurisprudence scholars
universally agree that a jural relation - one of Hohfeld's - must exist
in law. But Professor Fikentscher states that "[in synepeics, . . . this
transposing method applied to one's own concepts of right and wrong is
rejected, and the right to measure 'eastern' understandings of law with
the yardsticks of western 'reality' concepts is denied."2 9 This raises ba-
25 Id. at 135.
26 Id. at 135-37.
27 Id. at 137.
28 Id. at 143.
29 Id. at 145.
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sic questions of ethics and smacks of a relativism. It also implies accept-
ance of the claim that western jurisprudence is a limited folk thought.
What, finally, is Professor Fikentscher's synepeical definition of law?
His four-point criteria are "values and method, applied in a system and
in the course of time."' 30 His later statement is that "law, viewed
synepeically, can be defined as a set of authorizing sanctions, being the
result of values methodically applied in order to mould reality in sys-
tem and time .... -31 In his summary, he states: "law is, synepeically,
an (1) authorizing (2) sanctioned (3) ought based on the result of (4)
values (5) methodically applied in (6) system and (7) time .. *"32
In view of his apparent relativism, it is permissible, indeed necessary,
to ask how this definition distinguishes law from the rules of unions or,
indeed, from the rules of criminal gangs. Moreover, is "system" in-
cluded in this definition even though he suggests it does not fit frag-
mented societies?33 Finally, it is unclear whether Professor Fikentscher
ever used the diverse thought-ways emphasized in the first part of his
paper. What we are given is a scholar's abstraction on a higher level of
generality than those of traditional western jurisprudence.
Some anthropologists treat western jurisprudence as a folk-way that
is simply imposed on eastern cultures. After Austin was appointed the
first professor of jurisprudence in London, he went to Germany to
study the German commentaries on Roman law and Roman concepts
of law. Returning to England, Austin sought concepts common to ad-
vanced legal systems. Some of the basic concepts of western jurispru-
dence were expressed in Plato's dialogues. Therefore, the charge that
western jurisprudence is biased, ethnic, and a folk-way is an im-
plausible assertion. One need not go to eastern cultures or to pre-liter-
ate societies to find diverse conceptions of law. If one adds the different
theories of anthropologists to the many different concepts and theories
in the United States, the total number, as Professor Fikentscher says, is
"legion." One can dismiss all of these theories as exercises in futility, or
one can espouse and defend a philosophy of law in ways that others can
test and evaluate. There is wide agreement on analytical jurisprudence;
in any case, it is necessary to distinguish scholars' theories of law from
public opinions.
Certain questions call for further discussion. The first area of query
concerns ethical relativism. The second area concerns western jurispru-
30 Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
31 Id. at 161 (emphasis in original).
32 Id. at 167 (emphasis in original).
33 Id. at 153.
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dence: is it a folk-way that is biased and ethnic, or does it have objective
validity? The third area of intrigue involves Bohannan's thesis that to
understand a tribe or society one must understand that tribe's or soci-
ety's concepts, not translate them in terms of our ways of thought.
These areas raise questions regarding comparison,34 e.g., in contrast
with Professor Fikentscher's reliance on meta-concepts. It is preferable,
in the writer's view, to assimilate or distinguish foreign concepts from
one's own concepts.
I have discussed the logic and theory of comparison in my COMPARATIVE LAW
AND SOCIAL THEORY 47-48, 97 (1963) and in FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE
135-37 (1973).
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